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A Brief History of Chicana/o
School Segregation:
One Rationale for Affirmative Action
Margaret E. Montoyat
Muy buenas tardes. Mil gracias por invitarme a hablar con Uds; es un
privilegio para mi. Felicitaci6nes a las organizadoras de esta conferencia. Good
afternoon and thank you for inviting me to speak. i
INTRODUCTION
People can't get to be judges without first going to law school, and
Latinas/as can't get to law school, at least in significant numbers, without
affirmative action. With very few exceptions, the roomful of judges, law professors,
lawyers and law students we saw over the past two days did not get to be where they
are without affirmative action. When we fight for affirmative action, we fight for
access to the legal profession; we fight to be public policymakers. Thus, fighting for
affirmative action is a righteous struggle. It is about the well-being of our
communities. It is about having a place at the table. It is about self-determination. It
is about justice -- social justice, distributive justice and substantive justice.
Affirmative action is the vortex of the civil rights struggle for this generation. I
applaud your efforts and your struggles. I applaud you for organizing this
conference on affirmative action.
Over the last two days, some have cautioned you not to neglect your
studies. You have been told that you are to be students first and activists later. I am
not of that opinion. I believe that students ---especially law students, and most
particularly law students of color, at elite universities - have a special responsibility
to respond in organized ways to the institutional and structural racism and other
forms of subordination that limit opportunities in this society. Students are heirs to a
rich history of oppositional social action and dissent; they have been key leaders in
movements for civil rights and human rights and against various military campaigns.
Here at Berkeley, students have spearheaded movements that have changed the
entire nation. I am thinking about the Free Speech movement, the Third World
strike, the Coalition for a Diversified Faculty and now the organizing in support of
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affirmative action and against Proposition 209 and the UC Regents' resolutions
prohibiting the consideration of race and gender in student admissions and financial
aid.
I exhort you to become involved and to be student activists, and I do so
because I know it can make you better law students and better lawyers in the future.
Your activism can contribute to your education in the following ways: first, it can
expand your understanding of substantive law and hone your legal skills; second, it
can construct and transform your identity/identities by strengthening your ties to
subordinated populations; and third, it can teach you to build community and to
value solidarity.
I suggest that you read Sumi Cho and Robert Westley's article, Critical
Race Coalitions: Key Movements that Performed the Theory 1 for some historical
perspective on student activism here at Berkeley. Professors Cho and Westley argue
that one of the origins of Critical Race Theory was the student movement of the
l980's here at Berkeley. 2 That is a powerful example of how legal theory, curricula,
and pedagogical practices, in and out of law schools, changed as a result of student
interventions.
Student activism also engenders identity-formation and -transformation.
For Raza students, this has been true since the heyday of the Chicano/a movement in
the 1960s and 70s. Many of us learned through our activism what it meant to adopt
a politicized racial/ethnic identity like Chicano/a. Nuestra conscientizaci6n was
nurtured through our activism. Moreover, we learned that the class-jumping we
were experiencing through access to elite educational institutions did not have to
mean an abandonment of our families or our communities. These were not lessons
we learned in classrooms.
Finally, student activism gives many students a home within, and a refuge
against, the inhospitable climate of higher education. The alienation one can feel
while in law school can be attenuated through student activism. Activism was
important for me when I was an undergraduate at San Diego State, serving in the
Student Senate and active in MECHA. It was important for me at Harvard, as we
struggled to organize a Chicano/a student organization (we didn't have a pan-ethnic
consciousness at the time). Activism remains important for me now that I am a Jaw
professor.
The Society of American Law Teachers has been in the vanguard of those
responding to the backlash against civil rights over the past decade. In January
1998, SALT organized a march in San Francisco that saw some 1500 law professors,
lawyers, law students and many others fill the streets. We marched from the Hilton
Hotel on O'Farrell Street to Union Square. Imagine, hundreds of law professors in
academic garb, lawyers in their black suits, students in their cool jeans and slouchy
sweaters with picket signs that read, "S.F. law firms support Affirmative Action."
"Educar no segregar." "Law Professors for Access to Higher Education." Imagine
Willie Brown3 and Eva Patterson,4 the presidents of the ABA, the LSAC and the
AALS marching and chanting. It was a wonderful event.
I. See Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions:
Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377 (2000).
2. Id. passim.
3. Mr. Brown was, and is, Mayor of San Francisco.
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More recently, SALT has organized three or four, depending on how you
count, conferences on topics related to affirmative action, the LSA T and
standardized testing. In early October, 2001, we organized a conference in
Cincinnati on Grutter v. Bollinger, the case challenging the admissions process at the
Michigan Law School. Over the past two years, SALT has contributed $20,000 to
help defray the litigation expenses of the Student Intervenors in the Grutter case.
On December 6, 2001, Miranda Massie will rise and address the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeal, sitting en bane, in Cincinnati. As you probably know, she
will be arguing on behalf of the Student Defendant-Intervenors, a group of 41 named
individuals and 3 student organizations. The Intervenors have reframed the issues
and reinvigorated the national debate on affirmative action and on the use of the
LSA T in student admissions. It has been my privilege to get to know the studentIntervenors and to work beside them and their lawyers.
Allow me to read a piece of the lntervenors' Reply Brief. They write:
The struggle for integration and equality has shaped and defined
this nation. This struggle has taken many forms. Sometimes, the
battles have occurred in open fields or at crowded lunch counters.
Other times, they have occurred in courtrooms or legislative halls.
When the cause of integration and equality has prevailed, we have
moved forward together as one society.
Today, the struggle to defend affirmative action and integration is
the touchstone issue in the struggle for equality and democracy.
Nothing in recent history has awakened the minds of students and
youth, and stirred them into action as much as the defense of
affirmative action.
Six years ago, when the University of
California (UC) Regents banned the use of affirmative action in
the UC system, most political pundits and legal commentators
predicted the end of affirmative action ....
The University of Michigan Law School (UMLS) case, like the
UC Regents' ban on affirmative action, has rallied students to act.
In 1999, this Court granted students the right to stand as
defendants in this case. The importance of this decision cannot be
overstated. This case has already affected the lives of tens of
thousands of students, who increasingly regard this case as their
own ....

For the students, the differences in this case are stark and clear.
Erika Dowdell, Concepcion Escobar, and the ten of thousands of
students they represent believe that higher education must not be
resegregated. Like the University and the amici representing a
vast array of different institutions of American society, they
4. Ms. Patterson was, and is, Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
of the San Francisco Bay Area.
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believe we must preserve the gains we have made in integrating
this nation. Indeed, they believe it far more deeply-for they will
live the future that will be determined here. 5
Miranda will then argue that the state may use voluntary race-conscious
measures to end the de facto segregation of its law schools and universities because
integration is a compelling state interest. This is a novel and bold argument. Our
prayers and hopes are with the Student Intervenors.
Keeping.this argument in mind, I would like to review and reclaim some of
the struggles and the victories the Chicano/a communities have experienced in
challenging segregated schools in the Southwest. I want to put to rest the idea that
we Chicanas/os have no claim upon desegregation as a public policy to remove the
vestiges of the de jure and de facto discriminatory policies and practices of the past.
Finally, I want to excavate the legal history that demonstrates that the Chicana/o
communities played a central role in dismantling the legal architecture that supported
the separate and unequal school systems throughout the Southwest.
The problem of segregated schools is currently of immense concern for the
Latina/o communities. In July 2001, the Civil Rights Project of Harvard University,
an entity engaged in empirical and qualitative research on segregation as a
contemporary issue, produced a report called, Schools More Separate:
Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation. 6 The report stated:
The 2000 Census tells us that Latinos have become the largest
minority group in the U.S ... They have been more segregated
than blacks now for a number of years, not only by race and
ethnicity but also by poverty. There is also serious segregation
developing by language. Most Latinos are concentrated in high
poverty, low-achieving schools and face by far the highest drop
out rate. Also, since most are concentrated in the large states
where affirmative action for college is now illegal (California,
Texas, and Florida), the concentration of these students in schools
with a poor record of graduating students and sending them onto
college raises important national issues. 7

I.
CHICANA/a DESEGREGATION CASES

In order to understand the complexity of the ways in which educational
opportunities were limited for Mexican/Mexican-American children throughout the
Southwest, it is necessary to remember that Mexicans/Mexican Americans were
5. Student Defendant-lntervenors' Final Reply Brief at 1-3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp.
2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75928), appeal docketed, (6th Cir. en bane Dec. 6, 2001) (No. 011447). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 855-56.
6. See Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation
(July 2001), available at www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights (unpublished report on file with Berkeley La
Raza Law Journal).
7. Id. at 3-4 (footnotes omitted).
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racially classified as White. 8 Having the Mexican mestizo/a accepted as White was
a legal strategy that was pursued by Chicano lawyers and their clients up to the
•
l 9 70s. 9 In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court held, m
Hernandez v. Texas, /() that
Mexican Americans were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but limited its
holding to the facts of the case rather than reaching the broader question of whether
the group constituted an identifiable ethnic minority. 11
Various forms of de facto segregation of schools were practiced throughout
the Southwestern states. 12 It was, however, most entrenched in California and Texas
and less widespread in New Mexico, where established Hispano families were
educated side by side with Anglo elites.
Christopher Arriola described the social separation of Anglos and Mexicans
in El Modena, California, the setting for one of the leading cases on segregation:
It was more common than not during the 1920s for southern
California towns to be segregated. Segregation in the citrus society
en~ompassed many harsh and unjust realities, from segregated
housing and public places, to inferior social status and political and
economic exploitation. Mexicans and Anglos lived in truly separate
worlds. According to historian Charles Woilenberg, 'segregation
was the rule wherever Mexicans reside in sizable colonies,! and it
was a reality, 'from cradle to grave.'

This type of segregation was institutional and was visible in all
aspects of daily life. Two common examples of segregation were
the movie theaters in the larger towns and the swimming pools in
almost every community. The five theaters in downtown Santa Ana
were segregated. Oscar Valencia remembered that, 'the bottom [the
main floor of the theater] was for the Americans, the top [balcony]
was for the Mexicans. They had all kinds of segregation.' The
'plunge,' as the swimming pool in nearby Orange was called, had a
'Mexican Day' on Mondays. It was the only day Mexicans were
allowed to swim. The pool was drained that night and was closed
on Tuesday for cleaning and re-filling.

8. See DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986
(1987). Montejano writes, "The death or resurrection of race divisions is fundamentally a political
question, a question of efforts, in George Frederickson 's words, 'to make race or color a qualification for
membership in the civil community.' .. .the Mexican people of the Southwest [were] a distinct ethnic
population.
Mexicans, following the above definition, were also a 'race' whenever they were
subjected to policies of discrimination or control." Id. at 4-5 (endnote omitted).
9. Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 307, 342 (1972).

IO. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
11. Id. at 479 n.9.
12. See Rangel & Alcala, supra note 9, at 320 n.74.
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Many organizations, businesses, and homeowners associations had
official policies to exclude Mexicans, but in many other instances it
was more of a general social understanding among Anglos that
Mexicans should be excluded ....
Such prejudices lead to the establishment of a separate 'barrio'
consisting of the downtown area of old El Modena. The town
became two separate worlds in one place. Mexicans were sold
'miserable little houses' on cheap lots in the center of town 'for a
good profit,' according to a long time resident.
Anglos left the
downtown area as more and more Mexicans arrived until the town
was virtually all Mexican. Most Anglos in the community lived in
small family-owned or rented citrus or walnut ranches in the plots
adjacent to the town. El Modena had developed a doughnut shaped
segregation. The Mexican community resided in the middle,
clustered into the town, and the Anglos surrounded them living
dispersed on the various nearby farms.
The separation went beyond the type and location of the houses.
Mexicans and Anglos lead separate lives. They went to different
churches, Anglos attending the Friends Church on the main street of
Chapman, while Mexicans attended makeshift Catholic services in
each other's homes until the frrst Catholic church was established.
Mexicans had a different cultural life. The Mexican/Chicano
community in El Modena brought in 'teatro' groups from Mexico,
had their own dances, ran their own restaurants and small stores, and
organized mutual aid societies which sponsored both Mexican and
American patriotic organizations. 13
In their outstanding study of school segregation in Texas, Jorge Rangel and
Carlos Alcala noted that "[it was n)ot until 1930 [that the provision in the state
constitution allowing separate schools 'for the white and colored children' was] held
not to authorize segregation of Mexican Americans." 14 In a 1930 case, Independent
School District v. Salvatierra, 15 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the
trial court that "school authorities have no power to arbitrarily segregate Mexican
children, assign them to separate schools, and exclude them from schools maintained
for children of other white races, merely or solely because they are Mexicans." 16
Even so, the appellate court dissolved the injunction prohibiting segregation because
there was no proof of intent to discriminate. It was within the "pedagogical

13. See Christopher Arriola, Knocking on the Schoolhouse Door: Mendez v. Westminster,
Equal Protection, Public Education and Mexican Americans in the 1940 ·s, 8 LA RAzA L.J. 166, 171-1 72
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
14. See Rangel & Alcala, supra note 9, at 312 (footnote omitted).
15. 33 S. W.2d 790, (Tex. Civ. App., 1930), cert. denied. 284 U.S. 580 (Oct 26, 1931 ).
16. id. at 795.
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wisdom" 17 of the educators to separate children with language problems. This
became a pattern throughout the Southwest: Chicanos/as were placed in segregated
schools with no explicit constitutional, statutory or regulatory authority.
Consequently, fashioning legal remedies for this discrimination using theories of
either de jure or de facto segregation would prove next to impossible. 18
The situation in California is illustrative, although it is important to
emphasize that each of the states had variations that depended on the importance of
Mexicans/Mexican-Americans to the local economy. Unlike "Negroes, Mongolians
and Indians" 19 who were prohibited from admission to the regular public schools,
Mexicans were never specifically mentioned in the Education Code of California.
However, by the l 920's they were by far the most segregated group in California
public education. 20
The first instance of court-ordered desegregation occurred in Lemon Grove,
California in Alvarez v. Owen. 21 A website maintained on the Mexican and Chicano
History of San Diego describes the dispute:
On July 23, 1930 the Lemon Grove school board began to discuss
what to do with the more than 75 Mexican students who were
attending the local grammar school. It was decided to build a
separate school for them but no notice was given to the parents of
the Mexicano students.
On January 5, 193 l the principal of the Lemon Grove Grammar
School, Jerome T. Greene stood a the door of the school and
directed the incoming Mexican students to go to the new school
building, a wooden structure that came to be call "La Caballeriza,"
(the barn). Instead the students returned home and thereafter the
parents refused to send their children to the separate school. ...
[Enrique Ferreira, the Mexican consul,] put the parents in touch
with Fred C. Noon and A.C. Brinkley, two lawyers who had
worked for the consul in the past and from there they filed a writ
of mandate to prevent the school board from forcing their children
to attend the segregated school. They chose a student, Roberto
Alvarez, to be the plaintiff in the class action suit. ...
On February 24, 1931 Judge Claude Chambers began hearing the
case. Fred Noon ... called ten witnesses to the stand to challenge
the school board's contention that the Mexican children were

17. Id. at 794.
18. See Rangel & Alcala, supra note 9, at 334 n.150.
19. See CHARLES WOLLENBERG, ALL DELI BERA TE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND EXCLUSION IN
CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1855-1975, at 118 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1976).
20. Id. at 123. In 1929, "parental action did lead State Attorney General U.S. Webb to rule ...
that segregation of Mexican children was not supported by California law."
21. No. 66-625 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 17, 1931 ).
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educationally backward. Most of the students had been born in the
United States and spoke English. At least one student spoke no
Spanish at all. In the interrogatory Judge Chambers revealed the
injustice of the differential treatment of Mexican students.
Judge
Chambers:

When there are American children who are
behind, what do you do with them?

Answer:

They are kept in a lower grade.

Judge
Chambers:

You don't segregate them? Why not do the
same with the other children? Wouldn't the
association of American and Mexican children
be favorable to the learning of English for these
children?

Answer:

(silence)

[Judge Chambers] ruled against the Lemon Grove school district
and ordered them to reinstate the children in the regular school. 22
The Court concluded that Mexicans were neither Negroes nor Indians (nor
Mongolians, the other category segregated under the California Education Code) and
their segregation was therefore unlawful. 23
In 1976, Charles Wollenberg wrote a dissertation that was to be published
as a book called All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California
Schools, 1855-1975. 2 ., In it, he describes the actions taken by school boards
throughout California to segregate Black, Japanese, Chinese, Indian and
Mexican/Mexican-American children.
The end of World War II brought renewed protests against school
segregation by Mexican-American parents (partly, Dr. Wollenberg explains, because
racism had attached itself to Hitler and the Nazis). 25 By 1945, pressure was brought
to bear on the school boards in Ontario, Mendota, Riverside, and San Bernardino. 26
In Westminster, several parents including Gonzalo Mendez wanted a bond issue

22. See San Diego Mexican & Chicano History, Chapter 7: What was the Lemon Grove
School Desegregation Case All About? at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/dept/mas/chicanohistory/chapter07/
c07s02.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2001 ).
23. Id. See also, Kristi L. Bowman, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1751 (2001) infra note 61, at 1771.
24. Wollenberg, supra note 19.
25. Id. at 120.
26. Id. at 125.
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passed for the construction of a new integrated school. 27 The school board proposed
it but the voters turned it down. 28
On March 2, 1945, five fathers-Gonzalo Mendez, Thomas Estrada,
William Guzman, Frank Palomino, and Lorenzo Ramirez-sued the Westminster,
Garden Grove, Santa Ana and El Modeno school districts of Orange County,
claiming that their children were the victims of unconstitutional discrimination. 29
This lawsuit was to bring an end to de jure segregation in California schools. 30 The
irony was that the lawsuit was brought and won by Mexican Americans who had not
been explicitly segregated. 31
David Marcus, the attorney in the Mendez case, sued in federal court
alleging that the four school districts maintained elementary schools with I 00
percent Mexican/Mexican-American enrollment and that this violated the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the children of"Mexican and Latin descent." 32 The
school board defended by arguing first that the federal courts had no jurisdiction in
the case because education was a state matter. Second, the school board argued that
the students were separated not because of race or nationality but because they
lacked English-language skills and American values and culture. Finally, the school
board "pointed out" that the principle of "separate but equal" was the law of the
land. 33
On February 18, 1946, Judge Paul J. McCormick concluded that the P/essy
v. Ferguson precedent was inapposite because the California code did not provide
for the establishment of "Mexican" schools. Therefore, their establishment was
arbitrary action taken without "due process of law," raising an issue under the
Fourteenth Amendment and conferring jurisdiction on the Court. 34
Judge
McCormick rejected the educational rationalizations for the separate schools,
concluding that language difficulties would not warrant segregating children through
the eighth grade. 35 Judge McCormick also rejected arguments that the children were
intellectually inferior and heralded the notion that integration would instill "a
common cultural attitude among the school children which is imperative for the
perpetuation of American institutions and ideals." 36
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ld.at108.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 108 and I 18.
32. Id. at 125 and 126.
33. Id. at 126-127.
34. Id. at 127 (citing Mendez v. Westminster School Dist. of Orange County. 64 F. Supp. 544
(C.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947)).
35. Id. at 127.
36. Id. at 128 (citing Mendez v. Westminster School Dist. of Orange County. 64 F. Supp. 544
(C.D. Cal. 1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947)).

168

BERKELEY LA RAZA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12: 159

On December JO, 1946, Joel Ogle filed his appeal with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. Amicus briefs were filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Lawyers Guild, the American Jewish
.Congress, and the Japanese American Citizens League. Thurgood Marshall and
Robert Carter wrote the brief for the National Association for the Advancement of
37
Colored People asking the Court to strike down the "separate but equal" doctrine.
Dr. Wollenberg describes that during the oral argument, when Marcus
noted that virtually ,all children with Spanish surnames were segregated within the
Orange County schools, Judge William Denton asked what would happen to a child
named O'Shaughnessy who was "five-sixths Spanish." . Marcus assured the judge
that he too would be segregated because the districts used appearance as well as
family name. 38
On April 14, 1947, the seven judges of the Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the lower court's decision. But Judge Albert Lee Stevens' opinion refused
to rule on the issue of "separate but equal." Mr. Arriola described the decision by
the Ninth Circuit:
The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court opinion on the grounds
that the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated
by segregation, because no California law allowed the school boards
to segregate Mexican school children. The segregation constituted
unequal enforcement of the law. The segregation was not based on
race discrimination, but rather was based on class discrimination
against Mexican-American children. In fact, the court refused to
confront the race issue and quickly sidestepped it. The Court never
ruled on whether Mexicans are a group, an ethnicity, or a race,
merely stating that Mexican American school children had been
discriminated against and their Fourteenth Amendment rights had
been violated.
The Ninth Circuit, at this time, was not willing to take a chance and
rule that separate was always unequal, even though the opportunity
was presented to them by the District Court. They were, however,
repulsed by the actions of the school boards, and sufficiently
frightened by the amicus briefs of the AJC regarding the slippery
slope of social classifications, to take the necessary actions to end
segregation in the schools. The Court's ruling was insufficient to
overturn a significant corpus of segregation precedent, let alone
Plessy. 39
Nonetheless, this case was of great importance for Chicanas/os because it paved the
way for litigation in Texas 40 and Arizona,4 1 challenging segregation schemes, as well
37. See id. at 129.
38. Id. at 129-130.
39. See Arriola, supra note 13 at 198 (footnote omitted).
40. Delgado v. Bastrop lndep. Sch. Dist., Civil No. 388 (W.D. Tex., June 15, 1948) (enjoining
Superintendent of schools from segregating pupils of Mexican descent).
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as for other populations of color by helping to develop the arguments for Brown v.
Board of Education .42
In 1977, the UCLA Chicano Studies Center published a monograph by
Carlos Manuel Haro detailing the struggles of the Chicano/a communities to
desegregate the Los Angeles schools. 43 Mr. Haro described the winding path
that the cases would take. In August 1963, Crawford v. Board of Education of
the City of Los Ange/es44 was filed, thus beginning litigation that was to
culminate in sixty-five court days that filled sixty-two volumes of trial
transcripts. 45 Seven years later, in May 1970, Judge Alfred Gitleson held that
the Los Angeles Unified School District was substantially segregated. 46 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.47 The Court disagreed with Judge Gitleson that the state
constitution required racial or ethnic balancing. 48 Instead, the Supreme Court
held that the harm to minority children did not "tum on whether the segregation
[was] of de facto or de Jure character; it [was] the presence of racial isolation,
not its legal underpinnings, that created unequal education." 49
Although Mary Ellen Crawford was an African-American child, some
plaintiffs were also Chicanos/as. 50 In trying to come up with an agreement that
included Chicanos/as, Judge Egly, the judge who presided over the desegregation
hearings, suggested eliminating the assimilated or mainstreamed Hispanics for those
he called "the deprived minority." 51 The issues of desegregating school systems
with significant numbers of Black, White and Chicana/o students would present
themselves in other high-profile cases, most notably the case involving the Denver
school system.
It was not until 1970 in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District, 52 that Mexican Americans were held to be "an identifiable ethnic minority

41. Gonzales v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951) (holding separate schools for
Anglos and Mexicans with unequal physical plants were a denial of equal protection).
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

IN

43. CARLOS MANUEL HARO,
Los ANGELES (1977).

MEXICANO/CHICANO CONCERNS AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

44 No. 822854 (Cal. Super. Ct., 1963).
45. See Manuel Haro, supra note 43, at I 8.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 22 (citing Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of L.A., 17 Cal.3d 280, 295 (1976)).
50. Manuel Haro, supra note 43, at 26 and 29.
51. Id. at 72.
52. Civ. A. No. 68-C-95, 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex., 1970).
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group" for the purpose of school desegregation. 53 Thus, Mexican Americans were
finally afforded the same protection as Blacks under the Brown case. In Houston,
Texas, the school board responded to desegregation by pairing Black and Chicano/a
children. In the ensuing lawsuit, Ross v. Eckels, 54 Judge Ben Connally asserted that
Houston, and indeed all of Texas, had "always treated Latin-Americans as of the
Anglo or White race." 55 Judge Connelly opined as follows,
Content to be "White" for these many years, now, when the shoe
begins to pinch, the would-be Intervenors wish to be treated not as
Whites but as an "identifiable minority group." In short, they wish
to be "integrated" with Whites, not Blacks. 56
Finally, the Supreme Court took up this issue of whether Chicanas/as are a
"suspect" class such that they are entitled to protection under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Keyes v. School District No. I, the Denver
case, the Supreme Court posited that "though of different origins, Negroes and
Hispanics in Denver suffer identical discrimination · in treatment when compared
with the treatment accorded Anglo students." 57 The Denver case was brought by
Black plaintiffs and the issue of Chicano/a segregation was not introduced until the
remedy phase when Chicanos/as successfully intervened. 58 The Intervenors, the
Congress of Hispanic Educators, proposed a plan to require a bilingual/bicultural
program for Spanish-surnamed students. 59 This proposal was accepted by the
District Court but later rejected by the Tenth Circuit. The Keyes case lasted in
continuous litigation for thirty years from 1968 until 1997, when the Tenth Circuit
approved the declaration by the District Court that the school system had achieved
unitary status. 60

53. Id. at 606. See also Guadalupe Salinas, Mexican-Americans and the Desegregation of
Schools in the Southwest, 4 EL GRITO-J. OF CONTEMP. MEX.-AM. THOUGHT 36, 36 (1971 ).
54. Civ. A No. 10-444 (S.D. Tex., May 24, 1971).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 7.
57. See Betsy Levin, Salvador Castaneda, & Mary von Euler, Appendix A: Legal Issues
Related to School Desegregation and the Educational Concerns of the Hispanic Community, in
DESEGREGATION AND EDUCATION CONCER."IS OF THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY (Conference Report of Nat')
Inst. of Educ., Oct. 1977) at 75 (citing Keyes v. School District No. I. 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973)).
58. Id. at 77 n. 24.
59. Id. at 77.
60. See Kristi L. Bowman, The New Face ofSchool Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1751 (2001)
infra note 61, at 1792.
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II.
HISTORICAL ERASURES OF

LA TINAS/os

Fast forward with me to 200 I. This history of the struggle against the
segregation of Chicana/o children in the Southwest has been largely erased, This
jurisprudential history is not taught in law schools; consequently, Latinas/os children
Kristi Bowman
are not recognized as deserving subjects of this public policy.
writes in an article entitled, The New Face ofSchool Desegregation: 61
In Keyes v. Denver, the Court endorsed the White-Non-White
paradigm by deciding that it would classify Latinos with African
Americans for purposes of school desegregation. Since 19'73, the
changing racial composition of the United States and of public
schools has resulted in many courts' balancing schools according
to a White-Non-White paradigm that ignores the full spectrum of
racial and ethnic difference and presumes that Non-White groups
are fungible for purposes of racial and ethnic balance. The
White-Non-White paradigm is injurious to Brown's intent,
because instead of promoting equality, it promotes the dominance,
of whiteness. . . White dominance and privilege remain
unquestioned when "White" is the standard against which all else
is defined. This White norm has been particularly harmful to
Latinos, whose history has been marginalized even more than that
of African Americans. This approach to balancing schools
denies Latinos the full benefits of school desegregation. 62
Ms. Bowman notes that ''the Latino narrative is often overlooked in legal
education, especially in the area of constitutional law. . . . Of six leading
constitutional law casebooks, four overlook the topic of Latinos in connection with
school desegregation. " 63
There is other evidence of this erasure of Latinas/os. Jack Balkin, a Yale
Law School constitutional law expert, recently edited a book called What Brown v.
Board of Education Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite
America's Landmark Civil Rights Decision. 64
Professor Balkin offers this
observation, "In many respects, the honor Brown has received is ironic. Brown was
a case about school desegregation, but by the end of the twentieth century many
public schools in the United States remained largely segregated by race . . . . The
present tendency toward segregation of Latinos is, if anything, even more
pronounced than that with respect to blacks." 65 Professor Balkin continues, "[A]
61. Kristi L. Bowman, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L. J. 1751 (2001).
62. Id. at 1753 (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 1798.
64. See JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
(2001).
65. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
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majority of black and Latino students around the country still attend predominantly
minority schools." 66 Yet, none of the constitutional experts include Latinos/as in
their rewriting of this iconic classic of constitutional law. It is as though Latinas/as
were neither subjected to segregation in the past nor continue to be the most
segregated group in this society today.
On December 6th, I plan to be in Cincinnati for the hearing in the Grutter
case. I plan to be there to represent Roberto Alvarez and the parents from Lemon
Grove, I plan to be there to represent Gonzalo Mendez from Westminster, J plan to
be there to represent the Chicanas/os from Los Angeles, Houston, Corpus Christi and
Denver. I plan to be there because Chicanas/os have so much at stake. Our future is
at stake. So, too, is our past.
Thank you y mil gracias. Con safos.

66. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).

